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Abstract
A traditional argument in favor of exible exchange rates is that they insulate output
better from real shocks, because the exchange rate can adjust and stabilize demand for
domestic goods through expenditure switching. This argument is weakened in a model
with high foreign currency debt and low exchange rate pass through to import prices.
We analyze the transmission of real external shocks to the domestic economy under
xed and exible exchange rate regimes for a broad sample of countries in a Panel VAR
and let the responses vary with foreign currency indebtedness and import structure.
We nd that exible exchange rates do not insulate output better from external shocks
if the country imports mainly low pass-through goods and can even amplify the output
response if foreign indebtedness is high.
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Traditional arguments for exible exchange rate regimes, as advanced by Friedman (1953)
or Mundell (1961) and Fleming (1962), emphasize the expenditure switching eect. When
a country faces an adverse real shock, authorities can stabilize output with a nominal
depreciation that boosts net exports. Since then the theoretical literature has cast doubt
on the eectiveness of exible exchange rates to stabilize output when there is high foreign
currency debt or limited exchange rate pass-through.
This study investigates how import structure and foreign currency debt aect the sta-
bilization properties of exchange rate regimes. We rst synthesize the theoretical literature
on the eects of foreign currency debt and exchange rate pass-through in a stylized micro-
founded IS-LM-BP model, extending previous work by C espedes et al. (2003). The model
allows us to analyze the response of investment and output under dierent monetary policy
regimes. A depreciation increases a rms's foreign currency debt and reduces its net worth.
Because of nancial frictions, a lower rm value leads to tighter credit conditions and to a
drop in investment and output. The contractionary balance sheet eects weaken and can
even overturn the expansionary expenditure switching eect of the depreciation.1 The ef-
fects are reinforced if the country imports dierentiated goods of producers that have some
market power and price in domestic currency. If prices are sticky, a higher share of dif-
ferentiated imports implies a lower overall exchange rate pass-through. A higher exchange
rate depreciation is required to obtain the same level of expenditure switching.2 This can
aggravate the output contraction in the presence of balance sheet eects, making a oat
potentially destabilizing.
We introduce an Interacted Panel Vector Autoregression (IPVAR) as a framework to
test how country characteristics aect the response of the economy to shocks. Using a
sample of 101 countries we estimate a Panel VAR and augment it with interaction terms
that allow the VAR coecients to vary with foreign currency debt and import structure.
With this technique we can directly analyze how the response of output and investment to
external shocks varies with external debt, import structure and exchange rate regime. In line
with the theoretical predictions our results indicate that the insulating properties of exible
exchange rate regimes are strong in economies where the import share of high pass-through
goods is large and foreign currency debt is low. With a small share of homogeneous imports
and a high degree of foreign currency debt xed exchange rates display better stabilization
properties, as limited pass-through hinders the adjustment of relative prices under a oat
and contractionary balance sheet eects dominate.
In the remainder Section 2 briey discusses earlier work. Section 3 synthesizes the
relevant theory on balance sheet eects and the link between import structure and pass-
through in a simple model. Section 4 and 5 explain the data and the estimation technique.
1See C espedes et al. (2004), Choi and Cook (2004), Cook (2004), Devereux et al. (2006), Gertler et al.
(2007), and Tovar (2005) for previous theoretical studies on exchange rate uctuations and balance sheet
eects. Eichengreen et al. (2003) proclaim the inability to borrow in domestic currency as the "original sin"
problem.
2See e.g. Krugman (1986) and Devereux and Engel (2003).
1Section 6 discusses the main results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
The empirical literature on the stabilization properties of xed and exible exchange rate
regimes has a long tradition. Early empirical studies compare the unconditional volatility
of macroeconomic variables under the Bretton Woods system of xed exchange rates and
under the post Bretton Woods system of oating exchange rates (Baxter and Stockman,
1989; Flood and Rose, 1995). They nd little dierences across the the two periods, except
for the well known fact that the real exchange rate is substantially more volatile under
oating exchange rate regimes (Mussa, 1986). According to a study by Ghosh et al. (1997)
output volatility is lower under exible regimes, whereas ination volatility is higher. The
studies do not discriminate between real and nominal shocks, whereas Mundell-Fleming
logic suggests that xed exchange rates are preferable if nominal disturbances dominate
and exible exchange rates are preferable if real disturbances dominate. To identify real
shocks, a series of studies take advantage of the fact that the rest of the world is virtually
not aected by domestic conditions in small countries. For small economies a number of
variables can therefore be treated as exogenous. Several authors compare the response of
GDP to an exogenous variable under dierent exchange rate regimes in a single equation
framework. They nd that under a exible exchange rate regime the output growth rate
is less sensitive to variations in the terms of trade (Edwards and Levy Yeyati, 2005), world
interest rates (di Giovanni and Shambaugh, 2008), and natural disasters (Ramcharan, 2007).
A drawback of the single equation approach is that it does not look at the response to a true,
unexpected, shock and its transmission, but at the sensitivity of output to contemporaneous
values of a specic exogenous variable. Broda (2004) and Broda and Tille (2003) tackle this
issue with a Panel VAR approach and treat the terms of trade as a block exogenous variable.
They look at the response of real GDP to a terms of trade shock in a sample of developing
countries and nd that output responds stronger under a peg. Also within a Panel VAR
framework, Homann (2007) nds that exible exchange rates insulate better from shocks
to world output and world real interest rates. Miniane and Rogers (2007) provide evidence
that the nominal interest rate in countries with xed exchange rates respond more to U.S
money shocks.
None of the studies accounts for country characteristics apart from the monetary policy
regime such as import structure and foreign currency debt. There is a literature that inves-
tigates the link between the eects of exchange rate depreciations and the level of foreign
currency debt.3 Bebczuk et al. (2006) nd that depreciations tend to be contractionary
when foreign currency debt is high. Cavallo et al. (2004) show that in currency crises
highly indebted countries have overshooting real exchange rates that lead to larger output
3Hausmann et al. (2001) nd that "fear of oating" occurs more often in countries with high foreign
currency debt. Authorities limit exchange uctuations, although they declare themselves ocially as oaters.
This can be interpreted as indirect evidence of the favorability of xed exchange rate regimes under such
circumstances.
2contractions. Galindo et al. (2003) provide a survey of micro evidence on contractionary de-
valuations. These studies use exchange rate uctuations as an explanatory variable, whereas
we look at output responses conditional on an exogenous shock. We are not aware of any
study that investigates the role of import structure for the adjustment to external shocks.
Researchers routinely use interaction terms in single equation empirics to explore how
eects vary with country characteristics, but studies that employ interaction terms in VARs
are few. Loayza and Raddatz (2007) are closest to our empirical approach, but only let




Our framework builds on C espedes et al. (2003) microfounded IS-LM-BP model with sticky
prices, wages, and a nancial accelerator mechanism as in Bernanke et al. (1998). We
extend C espedes et al. (2003) by investigating the consequences of limited exchange rate
pass-through. Furthermore, to have a meaningful expenditure switching eect, we abandon
the assumption of a unit elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The
model consists of a small open economy with two periods, 1 and 2. There are two types
of agents: workers and entrepreneurs. We analyze the consequences of an adverse external
demand shock in the initial period under dierent exchange regimes. In the second period
no further shocks occur.
3.1.1 Workers
A worker's utility depends on consumption (Ct), labor (Lt) and real money holdings (Mt=Qt)


















Workers choose consumption and money holdings. They supply labor in a monopolistically
competitive market. They set their wage one period in advance and then supply the amount
of labor demanded by rms at the wage set. Log utility in consumption implies that expected
labor supply will always be one Et 1Lt = 1: Consumption is an aggregate over domestic










where  is the elasticity of substitution,  is a preference parameter related to the expen-
diture share of domestic goods and  =   (1   )
 (1 ) is a constant. Foreign goods are
3a Cobb-Douglas composite of homogeneous goods (CHOM
F;t ) with expenditure share ! and
dierentiated products (CHET










The only asset workers can hold is money and the worker's budget constraint is
QtCt = WtLt + Mt 1   Mt + Tt (1)
Seignorage is rebated via lump sum transfers Tt such that workers spend all income on















where PH;t and PHET
F;t are the expenditure minimizing price indices for home and foreign
dierentiated goods.
3.1.2 Production and Price Setting















Firm j maximizes prots jt = PjtYjt 
R 1
0 WitLijtdi RtKjt and sets prices in advance.





The market for foreign homogeneous goods is perfectly competitive. We normalize the
foreign currency price of foreign homogeneous goods to one. The price in domestic currency
is therefore the nominal exchange rate
PHOM
























are CES aggregates over varieties
with elasticity of substitution .
4Foreign rms producing dierentiated goods set their price in domestic currency one period






If a shock occurs, the exchange rate reacts, but because dierentiated goods are priced in
domestic currency, exchange rate pass-through to import prices will be limited.6
3.1.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs own domestic rms and provide capital. They start with a given amount of
capital K1 and a given external debt. The external debt can be denominated in foreign
currency (D
1) or domestic currency (D1). The investment good has the same composition
as the consumption bundle and rms buy it at price Q1: Capital depreciates completely
after one period, so that investment is the capital stock in the next period. In the rst
period entrepreneurs buy capital. In the second period they use their prots to buy foreign
goods. Entrepreneurs nance investment through their net worth and external debt.
P1N1 + S1D
2 + D2 = Q1I1
Entrepreneur's net worth is the return on capital plus prots minus debt repayment
P1N1 = R1K1 + 1   S1D
1   D1 = P1Y1   W1L1   S1D
1   D1
Because of capital market imperfections entrepreneurs pay a premium (1) that increases
with the ratio of investment over net worth.  is a measure for the strength of imperfections.7





Assuming entrepreneurs to be risk neutral, no arbitrage implies that the expected yield
on capital equals the cost of foreign borrowing
R2
Q1
= (1 + )(1 + 1)
S2
S1
where  is the foreign interest rate.
5For simplicity we assume that their marginal costs in foreign currency MC
F
t are constant at
 1
 ; which
implies that, if no shocks occur, all foreign goods will be supplied at the same price St .
6Campa and Goldberg (2005) show empirically that for OECD countries pass-through in the raw material
and energy sector is higher than in other sectors. They nd that a large fraction of the observed decline in
pass-through can be explained with a change in the import structure away from primary commodities.
7C espedes et al. (2004) provide a microfounded motivation for .
53.1.4 Monetary Policy
We consider three alternative monetary policies: an exchange rate peg, an exchange rate
rule, and a constant money rule. Small letters denote log deviations from the no shock
equilibrium. Under a peg the exchange rate is constant
st = 0: (2)
Under the exchange rate rule, the monetary authority controls the exchange rate, but lets
it depreciate when an adverse shock occurs
st =  yt: (3)
Under the constant money rule, the monetary authority keeps the money supply constant
in the period where the shock occurs and lets the exchange rate adjust endogenously. Over
the long term the authority cares about price stability and adjusts the money supply such
that the price level in the second period stays constant.
m1 = 0; p2 = 0: (4)
3.1.5 Market Clearing
In the initial period the demand for domestic goods comes from domestic consumption,
domestic investment, and exports. Foreigners demand an exogenous amount of domestic










In the second period, there is no further investment and, given that entrepreneurs con-










3.1.6 IS-LM-BP with foreign debt and incomplete pass-through
We log linearize the model around its no shock equilibrium. As detailed in the Appendix,
the model can be reduced to a system of three equations that correspond to the familiar






= i1 + (1   )x1 + [(1   ) + !  g ()]s1; (7)
where  < 1 is the steady state share of investment demand in domestic output net of
consumption and, correspondingly, (1   ) is the share of exports.  > 1 is the ratio of
6output to output net of consumption. A depreciation aects domestic output through two
channels. The rst term in brackets stands for the export revenue eect. A depreciation
increases the amount of domestic currency output necessary to satisfy a given demand
in foreign currency. The second term captures the expenditure switching eect. g () =
(1   0
1)[ + (   1)(   1)=] is increasing in the substitution elasticity between domestic
and foreign goods.8 The strength of the expenditure switching eect increases with the
share of homogeneous goods ! and therefore the exchange rate pass-through. If the country
imports only dierentiated goods ! = 0, the expenditure switching channel is lost, since a
depreciation cannot aect relative prices.






















The investment demand is a function of the borrowing cost from abroad and depends on
the risk premium, the risk free rate, and the price of investment. A higher world interest
rate  depresses investment.
The eect of output on demand depends on the degree of nancial imperfection  and the
ratio of total debt over net worth   =
 S  D+  D
 P  N . Higher output increases net worth. Higher
net worth lowers the risk premium and raises investment. Higher leverage   amplies the
eects of output on investment demand. Whether an exchange rate depreciation increases or
decreases investment depends on the extent of nancial imperfections and leverage. Without
imperfections ( = 0) a depreciation always increases investment since it decreases the
domestic real risk free rate (real risk free rate eect). The expansionary eects that derive
from the lower real risk free rate can be overturned by contractionary balance sheet eects.
A depreciation can be contractionary because it increases the ratio of nominal investment
to net worth. First, a depreciation increases the price of investment, which increases the
numerator of the ratio (investment cost eect). Second, it increases the domestic currency
value of foreign currency debt which decreases the denominator (debt eect). The strength
of the eect on net worth depends on rms' leverage   and the share of foreign currency debt
 =
 S  D
 S  D+  D: The contractionary eects that derive from nancial imperfections dominate
if nancial frictions , leverage   and the share of foreign currency debt  are high.10
8
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is the no shock expenditure share of domestic goods in the rst period.
9Where 
 1 = 1    + [1 + (   1)(1   
0
2){=(1   {)]














10While limited pass through diminishes expenditure switching in the IS curve, it also makes the eect of
a depreciation on investment in the BP curve more positive, because it limits the increase in prices. The
limited increase in prices reduces the contractionary investment cost eect and increases the expansionary
real risk free rate eect. If foreign currency debt is large, the eect of limited pass-through on the price of
investment in the BP curve becomes less important and the eect of diminished expenditure switching in
the IS curve will dominate.
7Finally the LM schedule is11
m1 =
y1






where we assume  = 1   Q  C=  Q1  C1 to be positive.12 Money demand increases with output
and decreases with investment (for a given output more investment means less consumption,
which depresses money demand). Under the constant money rule, the exchange rate adjusts,
while under a exchange rate rule and under a peg money adjusts to achieve equilibrium.
3.2 Adjustment to an external demand shock
We focus on the adjustment to an external demand shock. Results for a world interest rate
shock are similar and not discussed for brevity.
3.2.1 The peg
Under a peg the impact of an external demand shock on output and investment is deter-




























PEG (1 +  )y
( 1 + )
(11)




. Since the exchange rate does not move, the response of
output and investment to an external demand shock is independent of the import share of
dierentiated goods and the level of foreign currency debt. The strength of the response
increases with leverage  , as it amplies the balance sheet eect related to a fall in output.13
The investment response is a multiple of the the output response and increases with leverage
and the level of nancial imperfection. With no imperfection  = 0 investment does not
respond, since nancing costs do not move.14
11The LM curve is independent of the exchange rate due to the log in real money holdings. Allowing a
more general framework does not aect the results.
12Upper bars denote the values in the no shock equilibrium.
13However, holding the domestic debt constant and allowing total debt to increase with the foreign currency
debt (which corresponds to an increase in  ) would render the response of output and investment under
all monetary regimes stronger, since investment becomes more sensitive to the output drop caused by the
negative external demand shock.
14With no capital market imperfections ( = 0) the solution simplies to
@y
@x = (1   )(1   )=(1   ):
Since investment is independent of output, the reaction of output remains only a function of the importance
of the external demand in total output.
83.2.2 The exchange rate rule
We combine the IS and BP equation (7), (8) with the exchange rate rule st =  yt. We
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The rst eect is identical to the peg. The other terms are a function of the exchange rate
rule parameter .15 Accordingly,  = 0 replicates the peg. The second and fourth terms
stand for two channels that make depreciations expansionary. The second term reects the
expenditure switching eect: high pass-through (high !) and high substitution elasticity
(high g) dampen the eects of an external demand shock. The fourth term reects the export
value eect which is increasing in the export share (1   ): The third and fth terms stem
from nancial imperfections and can make depreciations contractionary because they aect
the ratio of investment over net worth. The third term is the balance sheet eect related to
the share of foreign debt: the higher  the more destabilizing is a countercyclical exchange
rate policy. The fth term reects the investment cost eect on the risk premium. The last
term is the real risk free rate eect.
It follows that higher foreign currency debt and a lower share of homogeneous goods






































The inequality in (13) follows immediately from all coecients being positive. For (14)
the sign of the derivative depends on the second term in brackets, which reects the relative
importance of the real risk free rate and investment cost eect as opposed to the expenditure
switching eect. In the appendix we proof that for  > 1 the second term is always negative.
The ability of a countercyclical exchange rate rule to stabilize the economy diminishes
with the share of imported dierentiated goods and the level of foreign currency debt. We
can calculate the threshold for which such a policy becomes actually more destabilizing



















15We assume  not too strong, such that @y=@x > 0.









Peg = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
Float > 0 > 0 < 0 <? > 0
Table 1: Summary of Theoretical Predictions
An economy reaches the threshold foreign currency debt share more quickly if exchange
rate pass-through !0 is low, such that the expenditure switching eects are small, and
leverage and nancial imperfections are strong. Note that the threshold is independent of
the strength of countercyclicality .
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The rst two terms capture the eect of a change in output on net worth and the external
nance premium. The third term in brackets captures the additional eects that come from
exchange rate changes, since @s
@x =  
@y
@x. The rst terms within the brackets stand for the
eects of a depreciation on the risk premium, both via increasing the price of investment
and by increasing the domestic currency value of foreign debt. The second part captures the
eect on the domestic real risk free interest rate and is independent of the level of nancial
frictions. A higher share of foreign currency debt increases the response of investment.
The eect of the import structure is ambiguous, because limited pass-through moderates





@xjEXR) dominates. Table 1 summarizes the predicted eects of foreign
currency debt and import structure on the response to external shocks under the dierent
exchange rate regimes. To illustrate graphically how the response of investment and output
change with the ratio of foreign currency debt and the share of homogeneous goods in total
imports, we let the parameters  and ! vary for given values of the other parameters..
The share of home goods in total consumption is assumed to be  = 0:6, the mark-up for
dierentiated products 10% ( = 11) and, the elasticity of substitution between foreign and
home consumption goods is assumed to equal  = 2. The capital market imperfection is
set to  = 0:2. We set  = 2 and  = 0:96.16  K1;  X1;  X2 are such that output growth
 Y2
 Y1




 P2 are one. We choose   = 10:6 such
that ratio of external debt to GDP equals 36 %. Using these parameter values we allow
16Increasing  lets the shape of the exchange rate response become increasingly concave.
10the share of homogeneous good imports to vary from close to zero to 50% and the foreign
currency debt to GDP ratio from zero to 36%, holding the overall debt level constant.17
Figure (1) depicts the joint role of foreign currency debt and import structure. It shows
the dierence in the fall of output to a negative external demand shock between a country





under a peg is smaller if foreign currency debt is high and the share of homogeneous goods
is low.
Figure 1: Output response to a negative external demand shock: Dierence between ex-
change rate rule and peg.
3.2.3 The money rule
Results under the monetary rule (4) are similar to the exchange rate rule. The similarity
is due to the fact that for an appropriately chosen  = (;!) the exchange rate rule can





. This insulates output better, through stronger expenditure
switching, if foreign debt is low. For the same reason the money rule insulates output worse
if foreign debt is high and the share of dierentiated goods in total imports is high, since
17There is a direct link in the model between the share of foreign debt to GDP and the parameter  which
is derived in the appendix.
11now the stronger depreciation amplies the contractionary eects. Analytical results are
relegated to the Appendix.
4 Data
We analyze the role of foreign currency debt and the import structure using a sample which
covers yearly data for 101 countries from 1974-2007. We impose the following restrictions
on the data: the sample does not include G7 countries, as the identifying assumption
on the exogeneity of external shocks may not hold for large countries. Because of data
quality concerns the study uses only countries for which we have more than ve data
points. We also discard very poor countries with a PPP adjusted GDP per capita of
less than 1000 dollars in 2007, small countries with a population of less than 1 million and
observations where the annual change in real GDP exceeds twenty percent. In line with
previous studies we only consider observations where ination was reasonably low (below
fty percent). Furthermore, we restrict the exchange rate regime to be in place at least one
period, to avoid cross-contamination due to exchange rate regime transitions. Data come
from various sources including the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS), the World
Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS). For a detailed description see the Appendix.
Foreign Debt We employ three alternative measures. The rst measure is short term
external debt over GNI provided by the WDI. We prefer short term debt over total debt,
since there is less of a roll over problem for long term debt and balance sheet eects are
less immediate. As a robustness check we also report results for total external debt. The
measure does not cover industrial countries. It is possible that part of the external debt is in
domestic currency, but according to Lane and Shambaugh (2009)'s dataset almost hundred
percent of external debt (as opposed to total external liabilities) is in foreign currency. As
an alternative measure we use the claims on the domestic economy by foreign banks scaled
by GDP from the BIS . The disadvantage of this dataset is that it starts only in 1983 and
only covers claims of banks from reporting countries. To reduce sensitivity to outliers we
use log(1 + debt), where debt is the corresponding debt measure expressed in percentage
points.
Import Structure In line with ndings by Campa and Goldberg (2005) we use the
share of primary commodities in a country's total imports of goods and services to measure
the extent to which a country imports high pass-through goods. The share of primary
commodities in total imports is proxied by the sum of agricultural goods, fuels, ores and
metals over total imports as provided by the WDI. Again we use log(1 + imp), where imp
is the import share of raw material in percentage points.
Exchange Rate Regime The literature divides between de jure classication and de
facto classication. According to Ghosh et al. (2002) the de jure classication may be
12understood as the intention of the authority, while the de facto classications attempts to
capture the actual behavior of the respective authority. Since we are interested in the actual
conduct of exchange rate policy, our preferred exchange range classication is Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger (2005)'s de facto classication (LYS) which covers the period from 1974
to 2004. The authors use cluster analysis on exchange rate data and ocial reserves to infer
the actual exchange rate policy. The main specication uses an exchange rate dummy that
takes the value one for a peg. We will compare our results with estimates using the IMF's
de jure classication (1974-2007).
Terms of Trade We derive our terms of trade measure from various sources. The choice
of the source is guided by the length of the provided series. For most developed countries we
use the IFS terms of trade, since it is available for a long enough period. For other nations
we use UNCTAD's terms of trade measure. If also the latter was not available for a long
enough period, we made use of the constant and current export and import values available
from the WDI to construct the implied terms of trade.18 For a detailed description and the
respective measures employed see the Appendix.
Foreign Interest Rate To measure the real foreign interest rate we use the short term
real interest rate of the reference country of relevance. The reference country is dened
as in di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008), essentially being the country by which a home
country's monetary policy is inuenced.19 Depending on availability, the nominal short
term rate is given by the money market or treasury bill rate and the real rate is obtained
by subtracting CPI ination from the nominal rate in reference country.
National Accounts Real GDP and investment in local currency are taken from the WDI.
5 Model and Estimation
5.1 Empirical Model and Identication
In order to examine the conditional response to external shocks we estimate a recursive



















































where EXVi;t is an external variable, either the log terms of trade or the foreign real
interest rate, GDPi;t is log real GDP, and INVi;t is log real investment for country i in period
18Apart from few exceptions, if various measures were available, they tended to be identical or at least
highly correlated.
19The original dataset is somewhat shorter than our sample. For missing countries we used the updated
information provided by Reinhart and Rogo (2004) on the partner country
13t. Ui;t is a vector of uncorrelated iid shocks, i is a vector of country specic intercepts and
L is the number of lags. a
jk
l;it are deterministically varying coecients.
We identify external shocks with a small open economy assumption. Small economies'
actions have a negligible impact on goods' world prices and the foreign interest rate. The
assumption implies that our two external variables do not depend on domestic conditions
and implies therefore strict exogeneity, which amounts to a12
l;it = a13
l;it = 0 for all l. Various
other authors found that the exogeneity assumption for terms of trade generally holds for
developing countries (Broda, 2004; Raddatz, 2007; Loayza and Raddatz, 2007). Since we
are only interested in the identication of the shock to the external variable, the described
partial identication scheme is sucient and the ordering of GDP and investment does not
matter.20
5.2 Interaction Terms
In order to analyze how responses vary with country characteristics, we allow for interaction







l;2  PEGit + 
jk





l;5  FCDit  PEGit + 
jk
l;6  RAWit  PEGit (17)
where PEGit is the exchange rate regime dummy, FCDit is the foreign currency debt
measure and RAWit is the share of raw materials.









l;6 = 0: We start with the results for this specication for compar-
ison purposes. We then look at the eects of import structure and foreign currency debt








l;6 = 0: Finally, we look at the most
general case in which all coecients are unrestricted. While we allow the coecients to vary
with country characteristics for output and investment, we restrict the external dynamics
to be independent of country characteristics, i.e. a11
l = 11
l;1 for all l. A Wald test does
not reject the null hypothesis and conrms the appropriateness of the assumption. As in
every VAR single coecients a
jk
l;it cannot be interpreted. We can, however, evaluate the
coecients at specic values and then compute impulse responses.21 While the exchange
rate regime is a dummy variable, our measures of foreign currency debt and raw materials
share are dened over a continuous range. As a benchmark we evaluate continuous variables
20Under the strict exogeneity assumption the model can equivalently be written in VARX form Yt = PL
l=1 ClYt l +
PL
l=0 DlEXV ARt 1 + Et and EXV ARt =
PL
l=1 FlEXV ARt l + Vt, where Yt =
(INVi;t;GDPi;t)
0 and Vt;Et are reduced form error terms.
21Loayza and Raddatz (2007) apply a similar technique, but let only the coecients on the external
variable coecients vary with country characteristics. The procedures leaves more degrees of freedom, but,
assumes that there is only heterogeneity in the initial response, but not in the transmission. The authors
nd that less exible labor markets and higher trade openness increase the response of a country's GDP to
terms of trade shocks.
14at a lower (20th) percentile and a higher (80th) percentile value.22 For the exchange rate
dummy the evaluation are taken at one (peg) and zero (oat).
5.3 Estimation and Inference
Since the error terms are uncorrelated across equations by construction, we can estimate
(16) equation by equation without loss in eciency. In order to control for country specic
intercepts we demean the data. We choose two lags following the Schwartz Criterion.23
Pesaran and Smith (1995) have shown that if there is heterogeneity in the slope coef-
cients across countries, estimates that impose a common slope are biased. The authors
propose a mean group estimator. However, using Monte Carlo simulations, Rebucci (2003)
shows that in typical macro panels xed eects panel VAR estimators outperform mean
group estimators unless slope heterogeneity is considerable. The reason is that the small
sample bias may be more detrimental to the mean group estimator than the slope hetero-
geneity bias to the xed eects estimator. Additionally, we are allowing slope coecients
to dier with country characteristics through the interaction terms. The use of interaction
terms should therefore alleviate the bias from slope heterogeneity. We are interested in
the dierential slopes across exchange rate regimes conditional on country characteristics.
Consequently, the mean-group estimator seems no viable alternative to us.
Since the impulse responses are a non linear function of the OLS estimates, analytical
standard errors that rely on rst order asymptotics may be inaccurate. To address this
issue we use bootstrapped standard errors as proposed by Runkle (1987) adjusted for the
fact that we are dealing with a Panel and make use of interaction terms.24 The procedure
may be described in the following way. 1) Estimate (16) by OLS 2) Draw errors ^ "i;~ t from a
normal distribution N(0; ^ ) where ^  is the estimated covariance matrix 3) use ^ "i;~ t and the
initial observations of the sample and the estimates of ^ a
jk
l;it to simulate recursively ^ Yi;1.25
4) After the rst period is simulated for all variables in the system interact the variables
with the interaction terms and now repeat 2 and 3 as many times as there are errors.26 5)
The articial sample, together with the interaction variables, is then used to re-estimate
22Alternatively, we can generate a dummy based on the division of country observations with high and
low external debt level and high and low raw materials share. While the continuous indicator imposes that
the response changes in a (log) linear manner with the indicator value, the dummy implies a threshold eect
relationship. Results with dummies (not presented) underpin our ndings.
23In the presence of xed eects and lagged dependent variables, IV (or GMM) estimators are preferable
from an asymptotic point of view if N is large and T is small. Fixed estimates are consistent for a large T:
24The programs to perform the estimation method as well as the programs to generate impulse responses
and bootstrapped condence intervals are available from the authors upon request.
25Dierent to the original procedure which was not described for the Panel VAR context, we draw initial
observations panel specic and perform the simulation for each country.
26We simulated the response for each country over the entire sample length and eliminated at the end of the
simulation those observations that where missing in the original sample to maintain the same weight for each
country as in the initial data. Since the procedure requires the multiplication of the newly generated data
with the interaction terms in the respective period, missing observations need to be lled by interpolation.
These observations will however not be part of the newly generated data as explained above.
15the coecients of (16) and (cumulative) IRFs are computed. 6) The procedure (step 2 to
5) is repeated 500 times. The 90 % condence interval is the minimum distance that covers
90 % of the simulated estimates.27
We test in two ways whether interactions with exchange rate regime, foreign currency
debt, or raw material share have a statistically signicant eect on the dynamics of the
variables. The rst way, as for example done by Broda (2004), is to check with a Wald test
whether the interaction terms in the recursive VAR model are jointly signicant. Such a
procedure tests whether the interaction terms can explain a statistically signicant fraction
of the overall variation in the dependent variables. The test allows no direct inference
on whether there are signicant dierences in the response to a specic shock, at a specic
time horizon. To address this question we compare (cumulative) impulse response functions





The null is that the response of two countries with given exchange rate regime, foreign
currency debt, and import structure to a shock after t years is equal. The standard devia-
tion of the dierence between the two responses (IRF1;t   IRF2;t) is estimated from the
bootstrap sample. 28
6 Results
6.1 Floats versus Pegs
As a rst step we contrast the response of output and investment under dierent exchange
rate regimes, irrespective of the degree of foreign currency debt and of the import structure.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative response of output and investment to a negative 10% terms
of trade shock using the LYS exchange rate classication. With a peg output falls by about
1 % in two years, whereas under a oat output falls by about 0.6 %. The result is therefore
in line with the classic argument that exible exchange rates are better suited to absorb
real shocks and conrms previous empirical studies by Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005)
and Broda (2004). According to a Wald test the interaction terms are jointly signicant. A
t-test, however, nds the dierence in the response to terms of trade shocks not statistically
signicant at any horizon. The responses of investment are similar and not statistically
signicantly dierent. Under a oat the response is even slightly stronger.
Table 2 presents the results for alternative specications. With the IMF's de jure ex-
change rate regime classication, we again nd evidence that the output response under a
oat is smaller. The results for a shock to the foreign interest rate are similar to those for
27Kilian (1998) showed that the IRFs may still suer from small sample bias. We nd no evidence of such
a bias in our results, since the mean of the bootstrapped responses tends to coincide with the point estimate,
the dierence between the two being the bias correction proposed by Kilian.
28An alternative to the t-test is to look directly at the empirical distribution of impulse response dierences
and evaluate which fraction lies above zero. Such a procedure gives very similar results.
16Figure 2: Impulse Responses for an initial 10% Terms of Trade Shock under LYS classi-
cation
Output Investment
1st year 2nd year 5th year 1st year 2nd year 5th year
10% ToT Shock, LYS
Fix -0.39 -0.98 -1.28 -1.21 -2.62 -3.28
Float -0.37 -0.66 -0.8 -1.38 -2.88 -3.45
Wald Test 0.01
10% ToT Shock, IMF
Fix -0.26 -0.73 -1.22 -1.46 -2.92 -4.13
Float -0.08 -0.35 -0.64 -0.02 -0.64 -1.4
Wald Test 0.00
100bps foreign interest rate shock, LYS
Fix -0.01 -0.27 -0.51 -0.03 -0.74 -1.87
Float 0.07 -0.02 -0.11 0.36 -0.49 -1.02
Wald Test 0.00
Stars (*) stand for the t test statistic that compares pegs and oats. ***,**,* indicate the t-statistic lies
below the 2.5%, 5%, 10% percentile and the response is therefore statistically signicantly lower than for
its counterpart. "Wald Test" reports the p-value of the test for the joint signicance of all interaction
terms.
Table 2: Output and Investment Response to External Shock, Conditional on the Exchange
Rate Regime
17the terms of trade shock. After a 100 bps shock output falls by about 0.4 % under a peg,
whereas output under a oat remains virtually unchanged.
6.2 The Role of Foreign Currency Debt
We proceed by looking at the response of output under dierent exchange rate regimes
conditional on the degree of foreign currency indebtedness (Figure 3). Flexible exchange
rates insulate better from terms of trade shocks if foreign debt is low: In the second year the
output response under a exible exchange rate is insignicant, while output has declined
by more than one percent under a xed exchange rate. The nding is reversed for high
foreign debt: Under a peg the output response is of similar magnitude as under the low
debt counterpart. The response under a oat, however, is substantially stronger than in
the low debt case and output declines by about 1.1 percent. A Wald test conrms the
joint signicance of all interaction terms. Pairwise t-tests nd a signicant dierence in the
output response between pegs and oats when foreign currency debt is low, but not if it is
high. Under a oat, there is also a signicantly stronger output response with high foreign
debt compared to low foreign debt.
The balance sheet eects theory suggests that the main reason for the dierence between
the output response of a oat with high and low foreign currency debt is investment. With
high foreign currency debt, a depreciation reduces rm's net worth more, which leads to
tighter credit conditions and less investment. Figure 3 arms the importance of investment,
although the condence bands are rather wide. With low foreign currency debt, investment
behaves similarly under both exchange rate regimes. It declines by about 1.5 percent within
two year. With high foreign currency debt, the investment response under a oat is stronger:
investment declines by 4.3 percent under a oat compared to 3 percent under a peg.
With the estimates at hand, we can simulate the accumulated response of output to
terms of trade shocks across various degrees of external indebtedness and dene zones for
which oats insulate output better from terms of trade shocks than pegs. Figure 4 shows
the accumulated response of output after two years for varying degrees of indebtedness.29
The response of output to the shock under xed regimes shows no particular sensitivity
to the extent of foreign currency debt, but under a oat the response rises with higher
debt. According to the estimates output responds less under a oat up to a short term
external debt to GNI ratio of 10 percent. Roughly 25 percent of all observations lie above
this threshold. The investment response under a oat is stronger for most levels of foreign
currency debt and increases also faster with debt compared to a peg. The higher sensitivity
of investment under a oat is consistent with the idea that balance sheet eects play an
important role.
Table 3 reports alternative specications. Our results for output and investment with
total external debt instead of short term debt are quantitatively similar, but not always
signicant because of higher parameter uncertainty, consistent with the idea there is less of
a rolling over problem for long term debt. Using claims of foreign banks instead gives again
29The conclusion is similar if we use other horizons.
18Figure 3: Impulse Responses for a negative 10% Terms of Trade Shock under LYS classi-
cation
similar results. Using the IMF's de jure exchange rate regime classication also conrms our
ndings. The results for responses to a foreign interest rate shock are a bit less clear. There
are no statistically signicant dierences in pairwise comparison of impulse responses, even
if a Wald test nds the interaction terms involving foreign debt to be jointly signicant.
Both with high and low debt, the response under a peg is slightly stronger. With high
foreign debt the response of output and investment is again stronger, consistent with the
interpretation that balance sheet eects become more important.
6.3 The Role of Import Structure
In a next step we attempt to shed some light on the role of import structure in the trans-
mission of shocks. A Wald test indicates joint signicance of all interaction terms. Figure
5 shows the response of output and investment in countries with a high and a low share
of raw materials in total imports. With a high share of raw materials and therefore high
pass-through, exible exchange rates shield output better from terms of trade shocks. In
countries that have a high raw material share and maintain a peg output falls by about 1.5
percent in two years, while it falls only by a bit more than 0.5% under a oat. For countries
with low pass-through the picture is reversed. Under a peg output falls by 0.5% and under
a oat it falls by about 1.5%. The dierences are statistically signicant in both cases. A
potential explanation for the higher response under a oat are balance sheet eects that can
no longer by compensated with expenditure switching. The explanation is consistent with
the response of investment. For observations with a low raw material share, investment falls
19Output Investment
1st year 2nd year 5th year 1st year 2nd year 5th year
10% ToT Shock, LYS, Short term ext. debt
Fix-HFCD -0.32 -0.94 -1.25 -1.03 -3.14 -3.52
Float-HFCD -0.42 -1.1++ -1.2+ -1.51 -4.3+ -4.82
Fix-LFCD -0.54 -1.04 -1.2 -1.2 -1.43 -2.18
Float-LFCD -0.23 -0.04 -0.1 -1.02 -1.57 -2.18
Wald Test 0.00 0.00 0.03
10% ToT Shock, IMF, Short term ext. debt
Fix-HFCD -0.24 -0.74 -1.02 -1.41 -3.39 -3.85
Float-HFCD -0.38+++ -1.00+++ -1.55+++ -0.87++ -3.2+++ -4.67+++
Fix-LFCD -0.29 -0.69 -1.19 -1.73 -2.81 -4.08
Float-LFCD 0.13 0.28 0.40 0.87 2.07 1.38
Wald Test 0.00 0.00 0.00
10% ToT Shock, LYS, total ext. debt
Fix-HFCD -0.18 -0.9 -1.26 -0.67 -2.66 -3.47
Float-HFCD -0.31 -0.66 -0.8 -1.32 -3.49 -3.83
Fix-LFCD -0.42 -1.02 -1.2 -1.44 -2.79 -2.92
Float-LFCD -0.31 -0.33 -0.44 -1.09 -1.51 -2.53
Wald Test 0.00 0.00 0.26
10% ToT Shock, LYS, BIS
Fix-HFCD 0.08 -0.93 -0.86 -0.31 -2.85+ -1.9
Float-HFCD -0.4 -1.05 -1.15 -1.12 -3.62 -3.38
Fix-LFCD -0.34+++ -0.74 -0.94 -0.51 -1.2 -2.03
Float-LFCD -0.57 -0.59 -0.79 -1.43 -2.4 -2.5
Wald Test 0.00 0.00 0.00
100bps foreign interest rate shock, LYS, Short term ext. debt
Fix-HFCD -0.1+ -0.39 -0.73 -0.74
++ -0.79 -2.86++
Float-HFCD 0.08 -0.15 -0.35 0.55 -0.8 -1.9
Fix-LFCD 0.1 -0.1 -0.27 0.42 -0.24 -0.83
Float-LFCD 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.06 -0.58 -0.78
Wald Test 0 0 0.29
HFCD and LFCD stand for High and Low Foreign Currency Debt. Stars (*) stand for the t test statistic
that compares pegs and oats with the same level of FCD. Crosses (+) stand for t statistic that compares
the response under the same regime for HFCD and LFCD. ***(+++),**(++),*(+) indicate the t-statistic
lies below the 2.5%, 5%, 10% percentile and the response is therefore statistically signicantly lower than
for its counterpart. The rst, second, and third column of "`Wald Test" report the p value of tests for the
joint signicance of all interaction terms, the joint signicance of all interaction terms that involve FCD
or FCD*PEG, the joint signicance of all interaction terms that involve FCD*PEG.
Table 3: Output and Investment Response to External Shock, Conditional on Short Term
External Debt and Exchange Rate Regime
20Figure 4: Cumulative Response of Output and Investment to a 10% ToT Shock in the
second year as a function of foreign currency debt
by about 4 % under a oat and only by about 2% under a peg.
As with foreign currency we can investigate how the respective exchange rate regime
performs by evaluating the cumulative output response at dierent levels of our import
structure measure. Figure 6 shows the accumulated response of output in the second year
for varying shares of raw materials on total imports. As expected we nd that the insula-
tion ability of the oat increases with the raw material share, when expenditure switching
dominates the balance sheet eect. For xed regimes on the other hand, the response of
output to terms of trade shocks increases with the pass-through. The response of pegs and
oats intersect at a raw material share of 14 %. Roughly 55 % of the observations lie below
the threshold.
If we use the de jure exchange rate classication a similar picture emerges, but the
dierences in pairwise comparison of impulse responses are smaller and not statistically
signicant (Table 4). The result is in line with our argument that actual exchange rate
policy is more important than declared policy. A Wald test nds joint signicance of all
interaction terms. If we analyze the response of output to a foreign interest rate shock, we
again conrm the that exible exchange rate insulates output only signicantly better when
raw material imports are relatively large.
6.4 The Joint Role of Foreign Currency Debt and Import Structure
Our results so far have shown that there is no empirical evidence that output responds
generally less to a real shock under a oat. Consistent with theoretical underpinnings we
nd the insulation properties of oats vanish for import structures associated with low
21Figure 5: Impulse Responses for a Negative 10% Terms of Trade Shock under LYS classi-
cation
Figure 6: Cumulative Response of Output and Investment to a 10% ToT Shock in the
second year as a function of raw material share in total imports
22Output Investment
1st year 2nd year 5th year 1st year 2nd year 5th year
10% ToT Shock, LYS, Raw Material Share
Fix-HRAW -0.76+++ -1.52
+++ -2.4
+++ -2.8+++ -3.09 -4.56
Float-HRAW -0.46 -0.61 -1.08 -1.78 -3.27 -4.09
Fix-LRAW -0.12 -0.57 -0.9 -0.46 -2.12 -2.33
Float-LRAW -0.64 -1.49
++ -1.47 -2.21 -4.14 -4.07
Wald Test 0 0 0.01
10% ToT Shock, IMF, Raw Material Share
Fix-HRAW -0.31 -0.87 -1.58 -2.84
+++ -3.51 -4.87
Float-HRAW -0.43 -0.44 -0.92 -1.49 -2.17 -3.41
Fix-LRAW -0.12 -0.65 -1.45 -0.79 -2.8 -4.34
Float-LRAW -0.2 -0.73 -0.81 -0.98 -1.63 -2.43
Wald Test 0 0 0




+++ -0.43 -1.36 -3.17
Float-HRAW 0+ -0.21 -0.37 0.58 -0.6 -0.89
Fix-LRAW 0.04 -0.17 -0.29 -0.11 -0.76 -1.56
Float-LRAW 0.3 0.14 -0.2 1.1 0.3 -1.59
Wald Test 0 0 0.17
HRAW and LRAW stand for High and Low share of raw materials in total imports. Stars (*) stand for the t
test statistic that compares pegs and oats with the same level of FCD. Crosses (+) stand for t statistic that
compares the response under the same regime for HRAW and LRAW. ***(+++),**(++),*(+) indicate the
t-statistic lies below the 2.5%, 5%, 10% percentile and the response is therefore statistically signicantly
lower than for its counterpart. The rst, second, and third column of "`Wald Test" report the p value of
tests for the joint signicance of all interaction terms, the joint signicance of all interaction terms that
involve RAW or RAW*PEG, the joint signicance of all interaction terms that involve FCD*PEG.
Table 4: Output and Investment Response to External Shock, Conditional on Import Struc-
ture and Exchange Rate Regime
23levels of pass-through and for high levels of foreign currency debt. We now turn to the
complete specication and let the responses be a function of the exchange rate regime,
foreign currency debt, and import structure.30
We take the value of the cumulated response of output within two years as a benchmark
and simulate this response along the grid of possible constellations of foreign currency
debt and import structures for xed regimes and exible regimes. Then we subtract the
corresponding value of the peg from the oat. A value below zero implies the response of
output under the oat is stronger. The lower the value the stronger is the relative response
under a oat. Figure 7 conrm the previous ndings and resembles the shape of Figure 1
from the theoretical model. The output response under a oat is weaker if the raw material
share is high and foreign debt is low. The picture weakens and nally reverses if either the
raw material share is low or foreign debt is high.
Figure 7: Output response to a negative 10 % terms of trade shock in the second year:
Dierence between oat and peg.
30Clearly this leads to a signicant loss in degrees of freedom, given that we employ two lags and work with
three variables. Nevertheless, results are in line with the former ndings and condence intervals remain
reasonably tight. To save space results are not reported but available from the authors.
247 Conclusion
Even though we are equipped with a battery of theoretical models about the implications of
the choice of the exchange rate regime under various rigidities and institutional frameworks,
empirical work has lagged behind. Previous studies have either not distinguished between
the various shocks that hit the economy or not accounted for dierences in the frictions
or the economic structure that aect the response to shocks. In the present study we syn-
thesize theoretical considerations in a stylized three equation model to analyze how limited
pass-through and foreign currency debt aect the buer property of a exible exchange
rate. We show that exible exchange rates do not necessarily shield output better from real
external shocks than pegs. With high foreign currency debt and low pass-through contrac-
tionary balance sheet eects dominate expansionary expenditure switching eects. Using
an Interacted Panel VAR for a large sample of countries we test and conrm the predictions
of the extended IS-LM-BP model by allowing the response of output and investment to
an external shock vary with the exchange rate regime, the foreign currency debt and the
import structure.
Our analysis focuses on how the exchange rate regime aects macroeconomic adjustment
to real external shocks. Policy makers will also care about other aspects when choosing an
exchange rate regime, such as its eects on ination, trade volumes, long term growth or on
the likelihood of nancial crises. Our results suggest that ceteris paribus the case for a oat
weakens if a country has high foreign currency debt and imports mainly low pass-through
goods.
References
Baxter, Marianne, and Alan C. Stockman (1989) `Business cycles and the exchange-rate
regime : Some international evidence.' Journal of Monetary Economics 23(3), 377{400
Bebczuk, Ricardo N., Ugo Panizza, and Arturo Galindo (2006) `An evaluation of the con-
tractionary devaluation hypothesis.' RES Working Papers 4486, Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, Research Department, July
Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist (1998) `The nancial accelerator in a
quantitative business cycle framework.' NBER Working Papers 6455, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc, March
Broda, Christian (2004) `Terms of trade and exchange rate regimes in developing countries.'
Journal of International Economics 63(1), 31{58
Broda, Christian, and Cedric Tille (2003) `Coping with terms-of-trade shocks in developing
countries.' Current Issues in Economics and Finance
Campa, Jos Manuel, and Linda S. Goldberg (2005) `Exchange rate pass-through into import
prices.' The Review of Economics and Statistics 87(4), 679{690
25Cavallo, Michele, Kate Kisselev, Fabrizio Perri, and Nouriel Roubini (2004) `Exchange rate
overshooting and the costs of oating.' Proceedings
C espedes, Luis Felipe, Roberto Chang, and Andres V elasco (2004) `Balance sheets and
exchange rate policy.' American Economic Review 94(4), 1183{1193
C espedes, Luis Felipe, Roberto Chang, and Andrs Velasco (2003) `Must original sin cause
macroeconomic damnation?' Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 234, Central Bank
of Chile, October
Choi, Woon Gyu, and David Cook (2004) `Liability dollarization and the bank balance
sheet channel.' Journal of International Economics 64(2), 247{275
Cook, David (2004) `Monetary policy in emerging markets: Can liability dollarization ex-
plain contractionary devaluations?' Journal of Monetary Economics 51(6), 1155{1181
Devereux, Michael B., and Charles Engel (2003) `Monetary policy in the open econ-
omy revisited: Price setting and exchange-rate exibility.' Review of Economic Studies
70(4), 765{783
Devereux, Michael B., Philip R. Lane, and Juanyi Xu (2006) `Exchange rates and monetary
policy in emerging market economies.' Economic Journal 116(511), 478{506
di Giovanni, Julian, and Jay C. Shambaugh (2008) `The impact of foreign interest rates on
the economy: The role of the exchange rate regime.' Journal of International Economics
74(2), 341{361
Edwards, Sebastian, and Eduardo Levy Yeyati (2005) `Flexible exchange rates as shock
absorbers.' European Economic Review 49(8), 2079{2105
Eichengreen, Barry, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza (2003) `Currency mismatches,
debt intolerance and original sin: Why they are not the same and why it matters.' NBER
Working Papers 10036, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, October
Fleming, John M. (1962) `Domestic nancial policies under xed and under. oating ex-
change rates.' IMF StaPapers 9, IMF StaPapers, November
Flood, Robert P., and Andrew K. Rose (1995) `Fixing exchange rates a virtual quest for
fundamentals.' Journal of Monetary Economics 36(1), 3{37
Friedman, Milton (1953) `The case for exible exchange ratess.' Technical Report
Galindo, Arturo, Ugo Panizza, and Fabio Schiantarelli (2003) `Debt composition and bal-
ance sheet eects of currency depreciation: a summary of the micro evidence.' Emerging
Markets Review 4(4), 330{339
26Gertler, Mark, Simon Gilchrist, and Fabio M. Natalucci (2007) `External constraints on
monetary policy and the nancial accelerator.' Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
39(2-3), 295{330
Ghosh, A.R., A.M. Gulde, and H.C. Wolf (2002) Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices and
Consequences (MIT Press)
Ghosh, Atish R., Anne-Marie Gulde, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Holger C. Wolf (1997) `Does
the nominal exchange rate regime matter?' NBER Working Papers 5874, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc, January
Hausmann, Ricardo, Ugo Panizza, and Ernesto Stein (2001) `Why do countries oat the
way they oat?' Journal of Development Economics 66(2), 387{414
Homann, Mathias (2007) `Fixed versus exible exchange rates: Evidence from developing
countries.' Economica 74(295), 425{449
Kehoe, Timothy J., and Kim J. Ruhl (2008) `Are shocks to the terms of trade shocks to
productivity?' Review of Economic Dynamics 11(4), 804{819
Kilian, Lutz (1998) `Small-sample condence intervals for impulse response functions.' The
Review of Economics and Statistics 80(2), 218{230
Krugman, Paul (1986) `Pricing to market when the exchange rate changes.' NBER Working
Papers 1926, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, May
Lane, Philip, and Jay Shambaugh (2009) `Financial exchange rates and international cur-
rency exposures.' American Economic Review
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo, and Federico Sturzenegger (2005) `Classifying exchange rate regimes:
Deeds vs. words.' European Economic Review 49(6), 1603{1635
Loayza, Norman, and Claudio E. Raddatz (2007) `The structural determinants of external
vulnerability.' The World Bank Economic Review 21(3), 359{387
Miniane, Jacques, and John H. Rogers (2007) `Capital controls and the international trans-
mission of u.s. money shocks.' Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39(5), 1003{1035
Mundell, Robert A. (1961) `A theory of optimum currency areas.' American Economic
Review (51), 657{665
Mussa, Michael (1986) `Nominal exchange rate regimes and the behavior of real exchange
rates: Evidence and implications.' Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy
25(1), 117{214
Pesaran, M. Hashem, and Ron Smith (1995) `Estimating long-run relationships from dy-
namic heterogeneous panels.' Journal of Econometrics 68(1), 79{113
27Raddatz, Claudio (2007) `Are external shocks responsible for the instability of output in
low-income countries?' Journal of Development Economics 84(1), 155{187
Ramcharan, Rodney (2007) `Does the exchange rate regime matter for real shocks? evidence
from windstorms and earthquakes.' Journal of International Economics 73(1), 31{47
Rebucci, Alessandro (2003) `On the heterogeneity bias of pooled estimators in stationary
var specications.' IMF Working Papers 03/73, International Monetary Fund, April
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogo (2004) `The modern history of exchange rate
arrangements: A reinterpretation.' The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1), 1{48
Runkle, David E. (1987) `Vector autoregressions and reality.' Sta Report 107, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Tovar, Camilo E (2005) `The mechanics of devaluations and the output response in a dsge
model: how relevant is the balance sheet eect?' BIS Working Papers 192, Bank for
International Settlements, November
28A Derivation of the Model
The steps follow closely C espedes et al. (2003) and are therefore brief.
A.1 IS Curve
Using the pricing rule and the fact that workers consume all income, the log linear version
of the market clearing condition in period 2 (6) is
y2 = { [(   1)(q2   p2) + y2] + (1   {)(s2   p2) (19)





















:31 Using equations (19) and (20) gives output as a function
of the real exchange rate
y2 = (s2   p2); (21)
where  = [1 + (   1)(1   0
2){=(1   {)]  1:
Using (21) in the log linear version of (1) the consumption level in period 2 is given by
c2 = y2   (q2   p2) (22)
Since no shock occurs in the second period l = 0; output deviations in the second period
are driven by investment.
y2 = i1 (23)
The linearized version of the market clearing condition in the rst period (5) is
y1 + (1   )[c1 + q1] = [i1 + q1] + (1   )(s1 + x1) (24)





















Since capital is predetermined and wages are preset we have from the workers budget
constraint ( 1).











31The share of dierentiated goods plays no role, because no shocks occur in the second period and foreign
producers of dierentiated goods take shocks in the initial period into account.
29where 0











= i1 + (1   )x1 +














A.2 LM: Money Demand
From the consumer maximization problem we have that the log linear version of money
demand in period one and two is respectively
 (m1   q1) + (1   )(c2 + q2   q1) = c1 (27)
 (m2   q2) = c2 (28)
where  = 1     Q1  C1=  Q2  C2 , which is assumed to be positive. Combining the above














The return on investment must satisfy the arbitrage condition with foreign returns adjusted
by a risk premium
r2   q1   p2 =  + 1 + (s2   p2)   s1 (29)
The marginal product of capital is given by r2   p2 =  i1 (1   ). Using this result, (26)
and (21) gives:
i1 1 =  ( + 1) + [1   (1   )!]s1 (30)
where  = 
(1 )+  1.
The log linear version of the risk premium is
1 = [q1 + i1   n1] (31)
The log linear version of net worth equation
n1 = (1 +  )yy1    s1 (32)
where y =  1 
1   (1   )
 
1    1 1 :
Using (31) in (32) gives:
 = fi   yy + [(1   )! + s]sg





=   + (1 +  )yy1   [(1   )! +  ]s1 + [1   (1   )!]s1
30Note also that there is a direct link between   and the share of debt to GDP. To see
this note that
 P1  N1
 P1 Y1
=
 R1  K1 +  1
 P1 Y1
 







 P1 Y1    W1 L1
 P1 Y1
 






Using the standard pricing rule
 W1 L
 P1  Y1 = (1   )  1
 this implies
 P1  N1
 P1 Y1




 S1  D
1 +  D1
 P1 Y1
Varying the share of foreign currency debt to GDP ratio
  S1  D
1=  P1 Y1

gives the implied    P1  N1=  P1 Y1

ratio (for a given level of domestic debt  D1=  P1 Y1), which in turn allows
to determine the total debt to net worth ratio   = (S1D
1 + D1)=P1N1 and the implied
foreign currency share in total debt ratio  =  S1  D
1=
  S1  D
1 +  D1

. Consider the standard
parametrization  = 11 and  = 1=3 then we have for a domestic debt to GDP ratio of 12%
and a foreign debt to GDP ratio of 24% that  P1  N1=  P1 Y1 = 0:04 and   = 9 and  = 2=3.
B Solving the system
In the following we use equations (7), (8) and (9) and combine them with the monetary
policy - peg, exchange rate rule or oat - to determine the respective implied response of
output and investment to an external demand shock.
B.1 The Peg
Under a peg monetary policy is given by s = 0. This simplies the system which determines











=   + (1 +  )yy (34)
The impact of a terms of trade shock on output and investment is determined by solving






(1   )(1   )
 
(1 +  )y





(1 +  )y
( 1 + )
31B.2 The Exchange Rate Rule
Under the exchange rate rule we have that s =  y , which we use to substitute out for






= i + (1   )x   [(1   ) + !g]y (35)
i =
(1 +  )y + [(1   0














!g   (1   0
1)!



















(1 +  )y + [(1   0





















[(1   0)! +  ]
( 1 + )
 



















For  > 0 the rst term is unambiguously negative, the third term is unambiguously
positive, and the sign of the second term is ambiguous, which makes the sign of the overall
expression ambiguous.
B.2.1 Evaluating the response of @2y=@x@!
To proof that the derivative @2y=@x@! < 0 we proceed in two steps. First, we show that
for  = 0 we obtain a negative value for the derivative. Second, we show that the value is
continuously decreasing in . Thus, the derivative can only be positive if  < 0 which is
not in the possible set of values.
Consider the term in brackets in (14) . Substituting out g () = (1   0
















  [ + (   1)(   1)=]

; (36)
since (1   0
1) > 0; it is sucient to determine the sign of the term in curly brackets.
32Now consider  = 0. Since  = 
(1 )+ > 1; multiplying all terms with  1 will not
change the sign of term in curly brackets and we have:
1   





  (1   )






The inequality follows form the fact that for  = 1 , we have  = 1 and thus the entire term




 + (   1)  1


are increasing in :The last step is to show that the (36) is decreasing in . This is quickly
seen by recognizing that g and 0
1 are independent of  and
@[(1+)=( 1+)]
@ < 0 since
 1 < 1 for  > 1.
B.2.2 The Money Rule
The constant money rule implies for the LM that
i =
1
(1   )(1   )
y (37)
Using this result in the BP yields:
s =  (!;)y (38)
where (!;) = B [(1 + )(1   0)! +     1]




[(1   )(1   )]
 1 
(1 +  )y. The system is completed by the IS equation (35). Using in the exchange rate






and demonstrates the equivalence be-
tween the constant money rule and the exchange rate rule if  adjusts endogenously to
reestablish the equilibrium in the money market. The solution for investment under the

















In the following we describe the indices and transformations which we applied to the data:
Exchange Rate Regimes: The de jure classication needed to be unied since it is based on
the changing IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restric-
tions (AREAER). The classication went through four distinct phases of change. It is
possible to group the countries consistently into 3 broad categories, oating, interme-
diate and xed regimes. The original IMF classication is coded in four taxonomies:
Taxonomy 1 from 1975 to 1976 includes: "Pegged to a single currency" (1), "Pegged
to a composite (including the SDR)" (2), "Floating - adjusted according to a set of
indicators" (3), "Floating - common margins" (4) and "Floating - independently"
(5). Taxonomy 2 from 1977 to 1981 distinguishes: "Pegged to a single currency" (1),
"Pegged to a composite (including the SDR)" (2), "Adjusted according to a set of
indicators" (3), "Cooperative exchange arrangements" (4), "Other" (5). Taxonomy 3
ranges from 1982 to 1998 with: "Pegged to a single currency" (1), "Pegged to a com-
posite (including the SDR)" (2), "Flexibility limited vis- a-vis a single currency" (3),
"Flexibility limited vis- a-vis a cooperative arrangement" (4), "Adjusted according to
a set of indicators" (5), "Other managed oating" (6) and "Independently oating"
(7). Taxonomy 4 from 1998 to today: "Exchange arrangement with no separate legal
tender" (1), "Currency board arrangement" (2), "Conventional pegged arrangement"
(3), "Conventional peg to a basket" (3,5), "Pegged exchange rate within horizontal
bands" (4), "Crawling peg" (5), "Crawling band" (5), "Managed oating (7) and
"Independently oating" (8). The "harmonized" IMF de jure classication that is
employed here is based on the following mapping:
New Former Classications
Unied Tax 1 Tax 2 Tax 3 Tax 4
Peg 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2,3,3,5
Interm 3,4 3,4,5* 3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7
Float 5 5* 7 8
Import Structure: The share of primary commodities in total imports is proxied by the
sum of agricultural goods, fuels, ores and metals over total imports. We use the data
on shares of imports according to various product groups as provided by the WDI.
We rescale the shares in terms of total imports of goods and services rather than









where we take the log to limit the role of outliers.
Terms of Trade: Despite the fact that the IFS, the WDI (net barter terms of trade) and
UNCTAD provide terms of trade data, they are not covering the entire sample. To
34enlarge the sample we constructed a proxy based on current and constant values of
export and import data. In particular we used exports and imports in constant US






which we scale to the base year 2000 to make the measure comparable to the IFS
data.32 Our nal terms of trade measure uses this measure, if the other measures do
not provide suciently large series. As a check we use consistently our ToT proxy for
all countries.
The choice for the indicator employed follows the length of the available series using if
possible IFS then UNCTAD and then the implied terms of trade from the WDI constant
and current value of exports and imports. Whenever a country's terms of trade remains
unchanged for three consecutive years or has breaks in the series an alternative classication
is preferred. The respective countries in the sample and the term of trade measure used is
given below:
32Other authors have used this approach before. See for instance Loayza and Raddatz (2007) or Kehoe
and Ruhl (2008)
35Albania Ghana Panama




Azerbaijan Hong Kong, China1 Poland1
Bangladesh Hungary Portugal
Belarus India Romania
Belgium Indonesia Russian Federation
Benin Iran, Islamic Rep. Saudi Arabia 2
Bolivia Ireland1 Senegal
Botswana Israel1 Singapore 1
Brazil Jordan1 Slovak Republic
Bulgaria Kazakhstan Slovenia
Burkina Faso Kenya South Africa
Cambodia Korea, Rep. Spain
Cameroon Kuwait Sri Lanka1
Chad Kyrgyz Republic Sweden1
Chile Latvia Switzerland
China Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic
Colombia Lithuania Tajikistan
Costa Rica Malaysia Tanzania2
Cote d'Ivoire Mali Thailand1
Croatia Mauritania Trinidad and Tobago
Czech Republic Mauritius1 Tunisia
Denmark1 Mexico Turkey2
Dominican Republic2 Moldova2 Ukraine
Ecuador Morocco1 United Arab Emirates
Egypt, Arab Rep. Netherlands1 Uruguay





1 Uses IFS terms of trade 2 Uses UNCTAD/WDI (identical)
Table 5: Country sample
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